Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind

Phenomenology focuses on the first-person experience, thereby highlighting the role of lived experience, subjectivity, and embodiment in the structuring of experience. As such, it explores the realm of consciousness from an experiential point of view and avoids the reductionist approach. The phenomenological method has deep implications for the vexing problems in the domain of philosophy of mind, where the nature of mental phenomena and its relationship with the world is analysed. The phenomenological approach in the philosophy of mind avoids the world-mind and external-internal distinction and approaches mental phenomena through the lens of embodiment, intersubjectivity and otherness as found primarily in the works of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.

Phenomenology also underscores the role of the body in making sense of the world. Body is not just an instrument through which our mind relates to the world; rather it allows us to anchor in the world. The anchoring happens through what Merleau-Ponty calls as the lived body, which orients us in the world. The notion of the lived body allows us to re-think the traditional notion of consciousness, intelligence and self/other relationship as conceived in philosophy and other disciplines. For example, in the works of Hubert Dreyfus we can find an interesting and critical engagement with Artificial Intelligence with respect to the body. Therefore, our research engagements are specifically focused on situating the notion of embodiment in the domain of philosophy of mind, medical humanities and Artificial Intelligence.

Faculty involved: Ashwin Jayanti, Saurabh Todariya